secure webinterface - change port 8006 proxmox 4.4
- Thread starter svenner
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- port secure webinterface
hey there,
maybe try next time google > https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/proxmox-ve-3-0-how-change-default-web-interface-port.13847/
as stated in the thread , just changing port is NOT security...
you can redirect via iptables for example
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8006
maybe try next time google > https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/proxmox-ve-3-0-how-change-default-web-interface-port.13847/
as stated in the thread , just changing port is NOT security...
you can redirect via iptables for example
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8006
It is possible in the perl source code. If you change the port there, it will get overwritten on the next update.
it's a lot of work and complexity for little gain, and the workaround is easy enough.
A lot of work to pull one number out of perl-script into config-file? I did not check the code yet but I doubt it can be so difficult. But ok, you are dev...
As for the rest: I completely and utterly disagree. Moving service from standard port is signifficant gain contributing to security (through obscurity though, but at the end everything counts). Try running public-facing sshd on default port 22, and then move it elsewhere for comparison. You will see the difference in log-files...
Workaround? You might call it easy enough, but I call it unnecessarily uneffective, when it comes to resources and security. Either proxy-server, or prerouting kernel-module must be active just because of this! This alone increases surface of possible attack-vector, but also denies the well-known "kiss" rule (which is even more important for hypervisor). Last but not least, every iptables-rule needs some cpu-power, which becomes obvious as soon as number of iptables-rules starts rising...
Hard-coding service to any particular port is imho very bad idea. I can not see any advantage in it...
As for the rest: I completely and utterly disagree. Moving service from standard port is signifficant gain contributing to security (through obscurity though, but at the end everything counts). Try running public-facing sshd on default port 22, and then move it elsewhere for comparison. You will see the difference in log-files...
Workaround? You might call it easy enough, but I call it unnecessarily uneffective, when it comes to resources and security. Either proxy-server, or prerouting kernel-module must be active just because of this! This alone increases surface of possible attack-vector, but also denies the well-known "kiss" rule (which is even more important for hypervisor). Last but not least, every iptables-rule needs some cpu-power, which becomes obvious as soon as number of iptables-rules starts rising...
Hard-coding service to any particular port is imho very bad idea. I can not see any advantage in it...
you are not talking about a simple single service like a web server instance, but a service which is part of an intra-connected cluster (e.g., PVE transparently proxies requests made to the "wrong" node, among other things). it's not as simple as "pulling one number out of a perl script" - even a simple search and replace of 8006/443 would touch 4 different git repositories and their respective packages, not even accounting for the question of how to know which node listens on which port in a clustered setup.
leaving this practical reason aside, if you think the solution to getting to many potentially malicious requests from the public internet on your hypervisor's management console (or SSH server) is moving its listening port to a non-standard one, I hope you don't run production setups with any valuable data. in 99% of the cases, neither your management console nor your hypervisor's SSH server should be reachable from the public internet - no matter which ports those daemons listen on. this is security 101, and not PVE specific at all. the correct solution is not having public access to those services (e.g., by setting up a jump host or VPN).
Quite bad example, as web-server can consist of many interconnected services as well.
Still I do not think replacing four hard-coded values with values from config-file is somehow complicated.
Maybe the same way as you know which node listens on which ip/fqdn?
I do not remember saying anything like that (contribution != solution) so your *if* condition is invalid.
I agree with that 1% you left for special cases.
Just in this year, OpenVPN had 3 security-related bugs. That's why I never rely solely on vpn. Ultimately, it is not bullet-proof, as no other software is...
My solution here was to use iptables REDIRECT.
After you add the rules, you can view them to verify they are correct and test.
Debian has a nice package to make the rules persistent. If you have your rules already in place when you install the package, it will prompt if you want to save the existing.
Use the following command to save future changes
Code:
iptables -t nat -I PREROUTING -i eno1 --dst <ipv4-address> -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8006
ip6tables -t nat -I PREROUTING -i eno1 --dst <ipv6-address> -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8006After you add the rules, you can view them to verify they are correct and test.
Code:
ip6tables -t nat --line-numbers -L
iptables -t nat --line-numbers -LDebian has a nice package to make the rules persistent. If you have your rules already in place when you install the package, it will prompt if you want to save the existing.
Code:
apt-get install iptables-persistentUse the following command to save future changes
Code:
# netfilter-persistent
Usage: /usr/sbin/netfilter-persistent (start|stop|restart|reload|flush|save)I made it but it did not workmaybe i made it mistake if you know could you share please ?
Debug/Inspect your iptables rules, there are also predefined rules to allow access to 8006 and if that is first hit, you can block whatever you want afterwards.